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Abstract 
We study the framework of optimal decision making under uncer­
tainty where the agents do not know the full structure of the model 
and try to learn it optimally. We generalize the results on Bayesian 
learning based on the martingale convergence theorem to the sequen­
tial framework instead of the repeated framework for which results 
are currently available. We also show that the variability introduced 
by the sequential framework is sufficient under very mild identifia­
bility conditions to circumvent the incomplete learning results that 
characterize the literature. We then question the type of convergence 
so achieved, and give an alternative Bayesian approach whereby we 
let the economist himself be a Bayesian with a prior on the priors 
that his agents may have. We prove that such an economist cannot 
justi.fy endowing all his agents with the same (much less the true) 
prior on the basis that the model has been running long enough that 
we can almost surely approximate any agent's beliefs by any other's. 
We then examine a possibly weaker justification based on the conver­
gence of the economist's measure on beliefs, and fully characterize it 
by the Harris ergodicity of the relevant Markov kernel. By means of 
very simple examples, we then show that learning, partial learning, 
and non-learning may all occur under the weak conditions that we 
impose. For complicated models where the Harris ergodicity of the 
Markov kernel in question can neither be proved nor disproved, the 
mathematical/statistical test of Domowitz and El-Gama! (1989) can 
be utilized. 
K eyword3: Rational Expectations, bayesian learning, con­
trolled Markov processes, sequential statistical decision frame­
work. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, the issue of how rational optimizing agents collect and process data relevant 
to their activity has received a considerable degree of attention. The underlying structure 
is quite familiar; a single agent plays a game against nature where the agent is maximizing 
expected discounted lifetime payoff while contemporaneously learning about the underlying 
structure of the economy. The simplest example of this framework are bandit problems 
a survey of which can be found in Berry and Fristedt [2]. We shall be concerned with a 
reasonably general framework where the agent knows the entire structure of the economy 
up to a set of parameters. The agent has some prior belief about those parameter values 
and gets to use his/her observations to update those beliefs. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that a dominant theme in the relevant literature has been optimal learning which has a 
Bayesian flavor varying in strength according to the authors' tastes. The attention has been 
twofold: first, what properties does the agent's sequence of beliefs display? and second, 
if this sequence of beliefs converges, do limit beliefs necessarily place point mass at the 
true parameter value (in other words, does full learning occur)? The answer to the first 
question has relied almost exclusively on the use of the Martingale convergence theorem. It 
is argued that a rational agent cannot expect his/her beliefs to change in any systematic 
(predictable) way based on his/her chosen action. Consequently, the agent's best guess 
of tomorrow's belief is today's, and the belief process follows a martingale. An appeal 
to the martingale convergence theorem, while imposing appropriate conditions immdeiately 
furnishes the existence of limit beliefs. The focus is then shifted to a characterization of limit 
beliefs in various environments.1 It has been known for some time that full learning need not 
occur even in an infinite horizon problem. The agent may decide to play an uninformative 
action forever, never getting a chance to learn the truth. Many examples of such situations 
1The references cited in this paper do not purport to be exhaustive; they merely attempt to give an 
idea of the work done in studying single agent decision problems under uncertainty. It is worth mentioning 
here that a number of papers have also studied the problem from the point of view of a (general or partial) 
equilibrium perspective (see, e.g., Blume and Easley [5], Feldman [18, 19], or the survey in Blume, Bray, and 
Easley [6]). To overcome problems arising from strategic considerations in these cases, agents are assumed 
to be atomistic, and therefore myopic maximizers. No single agent believes that his actions will unilaterally 
matter1 so indulges in single period maximization with respect to prior beliefs. Collective actions, however1 
generate information, which all agents use to update their beliefs. This form of passive learning, where
tradeoffs between information acquisition and current payoffs do not enter the agent's decision problem, 
is not our focus in this paper. Neither do we consider ad hoc learning procedures such as least squares 
learning (see e.g. Jordan [24], Marcet and Sargent [30], or Brock, Marcet, Rust and Sargent [7]), not because 
we believe that these are unreasonable mechanisms (quite the contrary), but because we wish to examine 
the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis under the conditions most favorable to it. In economic 
contexts, Rothschild [36] has invoked the Bandit framework to study pricing by a monopolist. McLennan 
[31] constructs an example of a monopolist who fails, with non-zero probability, under optimal conditions 
to identify parameters of the demand curve that he faces. In a general framework, Kiefer and N yarko [26] 
examine the related problem of learning the parameters of a linear process and arrive at similar conclusions. 
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are available in the literature, and we note that they do not seem to reqmre any special 
structure. 2 
In this paper, we present an alternative Bayesian approach to the issue of optimal learn­
ing. The objective of this paper being rather modest, we confine ourselves to describing the 
new framework, obtaining preliminary theoretical results and examining some other conjec­
tures by means of numerical analysis. The crucial point behind our approach is that beliefs 
need not, and indeed in general will not, follow a martingale process from the point of view 
of an objective outside observer informed of the true parameter value.3 It must be noted 
here that in general, different initial beliefs can have very different effects on the behavior 
of the system. From that point of view, we have to consider all possible initial beliefs and 
track down their evolution according to the true stochastic process. Indeed this is one of 
the crucial points that we shall discuss in a later section of the paper when the necessary 
technical toolbox has been developed. 4 
Since the economist knows that different agent priors may result in different behavior, 
and since there is no a priori reason (save for ones built into the model and/ or circular 
ones) to choose any particular prior, the modelling economist himself becomes a Bayesian in 
our framework. The economist places a prior over the space of agents' priors and observes 
the manner in which his own prior evolves with the system. We found it reasonable to 
assume that the economist's prior should have full support over the space of agent-priors. 
In summary, the economist specifies the underlying structure of the model, the decision and 
updating rules for his agents (the latter being Bayesian in the optimal learning framework), 
his own prior over agent-priors, and then studies the evolution of his own beliefs. We then 
2Stochastic uncertainty is not necessary for the absence of learning in the presence of optimal behavior. In 
a perfectly deterministic situation, where a single distinguished action would permit complete identification 
immediately, Aghion, Bolton, and J ullien (1] provide a simple example where the identifying action is never 
taken, and the decision maker remains ignorant forever. 
3To see this in an overly simplified framework, let the parameter to be learned be 0 E 0 = { 01, 02}, then
let the agent's prior be defined by f,1, his prior that 0 = 01. The Bayesian updating rule from his standpoint
··11 b f1 q(y,;ljil., 91lfl Wh t th t t' f f1 'th t t th Wl e t+l = ( I e )f ( I 0 )f' en we compu e e expec a 10n 0 t+l Wl respec 0 eq Yt+I ., 1 t + q Yt+I ., 2 t 
agent's prior distribution, it is trivial to see that it reduces to fl, hence the martingale property holds. This 
is clearly of little interest to the modelling economist since he knows what the true 0 is. The expectation 
of f,1+1 with respect to the economist's knowledge of the true 0 is clearly not equal to fl except in very
pathological cases. 
4It is worth mentioning at this point that the numerical investigations of convergence of beliefs in Kiefer 
(25] are in the spirit of the question that we pose here and for which we develop the theory to follow. He 
generates states using the true parameter value which he (the economist) knows and the agent is trying to 
learn as a Bayesian and looks for convergence of the agent's beliefs in that experiment. It is clear that this 
is the question regarding objective convergence which we define and study below and not the subjective 
convergence of Easley and Kiefer (12, 14]. Moreover, a close look at Figure 11 in (25] clearly shows how 
neighboring priors can have very different behavior over time, a fact that we shall underline in section 6 of 
this p�per, 
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examine the following questions: 
1. Does the sequence of economist beliefs converge? An affirmative answer will force
the economist to consider all agent-beliefs in the support of his/her limit belief (when
the model has been running for a very long time) when studying the behavior of the
modelled economy. 
11. If convergence of the economist's prior obtains, does the economist limit belief place
point mass at some agent-belief? An affirmative answer will offer a partial justification
of representative agent type models.
m. If the answer to [ii.] is also affirmative, does the almost sure (with respect to the
economist's limit belief) limit agent-belief itself place point mass at the true parameter
value? An affirmative answer will be a full learning result that can partially justify
equilibrium arguments such as the rational expectations hypothesis.
1v. If the answers to [ii. J  and [iii.] are negative, then we would like to know what portion 
of the mass (or the economist-beliefs) is concentrated on which agent-beliefs under the 
particular parametrization that the modelling economist chooses. This will in general 
require some numerical simulations of the modelled economy. 
In section 2, we set up the formal framework for analyzing these questions. This 
framework is a generalization of the standard repeated Bayesian learning framework 
[12, 14, 21]. Most economic environments are inherently sequential rather than repeated 
in nature. Stated differently, it is often the case that the actions today affect the 
environment for decision making tomorrow. By focussing on a model in which beliefs 
(via the Bayes updating map) form the only link between periods, the framework is 
unduly (and as we show in section 3, unnecessarily) restrictive. Our first results are 
obtained in section 3, where we show that beliefs - although no longer following a 
Markov process - do form, from the agent's point of view, a martingale. Intuitively, 
this clearly has to remain the case since the agents cannot expect their beliefs to change 
in a systematic way. The existence of limit beliefs now follows immediately from the 
martingale convergence theorem. In obviously suggestive terminology, we name this 
the subjective convergence of beliefs. We also show that under weak identifiability 
conditions of the true parameter, convergence to the true parameter takes place almost 
surely. This is in contrast to the non-learning results in the literature on the repeated 
framework where it may be optimal for the agent to repeat the same action forever 
which in that framework will insure non-learning. 
In section 4, we take a first stab at answering the questions posed earlier. We show 
that when the set of parameter values is finite (or countable), agent-beliefs always 
converge [a.s.] from the point of view of the objective observer with knowledge of the 
true parameters. Surprisingly, this follows as a trivial corollary of the results of section 
El-Gama/ & Sundaram, August 16, 1989 ___________________ 4 
3 based on the martingale convergence theorem. If the parameter space is uncountable, 
the true parameter value may be such that agent-beliefs do not converge almost surely, 
but (in a sense to be defined in section 4) this is a zero probability event. Having 
obtained convergence of agent-beliefs, we first examine a weak version of question [ii.] 
above. In the spirit of that question, we ask whether we can argue that beyond a 
certain point, almost all the agents drawn at random from the economist-prior would 
be sufficietnly close together in their beliefs. The answer - not surprisingly - is no. At 
any point in time, there is always a positive mass of agents whose beliefs are far from 
the rest. 
In section 5, we explicitely define the operator that determines the evolution of the 
economist-beliefs and review some mathematical preliminaries regarding conditions for 
the converg�nce of its iterates. It is clear that the limit of the iterates of that operator is 
the subject of questions [i.-iv.] above. It is also clear that with no further restrictions, 
the answers to questions [i.-iii.] can be of either kind depending on the circumstances. 
Very trivial examples that satisfy all the conditions in the paper can be constructed to 
show that 'anything can happen'. In section 6, we pick up where we left off in section 
5 and consider a particular problem. We subject Kiefer's [25] monopolist model with 
his same parametrization to numerical analysis in the spirit of our framework. Our 
numerical results strongly confirm our original ideas. Convergence of the economist­
and agent-beliefs occur rapidly. In that model, limit agent-beliefs split between full 
learning and convergence to the 'confounding' belief beyond which learning does not 
occur. The fact that neighboring priors can have very different evolutions over time 
(as seen in Figure 1 1  of [25]) becomes a lot more emphasized in our Figures 1-3. We 
then examine the limit economist-beliefs under different priors suggestive of tests of 
ergodicity a la Domowitz and El-Gama! [10]. 
2 The Repeated and the Sequential Statistical Decision Framework 
In this section, we introduce the sequential statistical decision framework that was 
informally discussed in the introduction. To enable distinction from the repeated 
statistical decision problem, we first provide a description of the latter. Since the 
repeated framework has been extensively studied in the economics literature (see, e.g. 
McLennan [32], or Easley and Kiefer [12, 14]), our exposition is relatively informal and 
brief. For greater detail, the reader is referred to Easley and Kiefer [14]. The section is 
organized as follows: Subsection 2.1 introduces some basic notation that is maintained 
throughout the paper. Subsection 2.2 provides an outline of the repeated framework 
based on the Easley and Kiefer [14] exposition and summarizes the main results of 
their paper. In subsection 2.3, we introduce the sequential framework of "learning 
while doing". It is shown, extending the work of Easley and Kiefer [14] that once again 
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resorting to the techniques of stationary dynamic programming is possible. Standard 
results from the literature are invoked to prove the existence of optimal plans. 
A word on nomenclature: strictly speaking, what we identify as a repeated decision 
framework in this paper is actually a sequential framework in the sense that uncer­
tainty about the true parameter value of the stochastic law determining the state 
variable causes today's outcome to influence tomorrow's belief about the value of that 
parameter. Indeed, this is what enables Easley and Kiefer to cast their problem in a 
dynamic programming framework. However, in the absence of this uncertainty, there 
is no connection between periods - hence, the term 'repeated'. In what we call the 
'sequential' framework, we allow the possibility that the action taken today affects 
tomorrow's environment regardless of whether the true parameter value is known or 
not. Uncertainty about the true parameter value in this case only provides an addi­
tional link between periods. We decide to use the term sequential for the latter model 
and not the former since the second case involves a natural sequential structure where 
the natural (technological, etc. ) environment determining the stochastic law of mo­
tion for the state variable depends on the current state and action, whereas in the 
former, the dependence is artificially introduced by the agent's attempt to learn the 
true parameter. 
2.1 Notation and Definitions 
Throughout this paper, the following notation is maintained: 
N 1 (Y, .F(Y) ,  v) is a measure space where Y is a compact subset of a complete, 
s eparable metric space, .F(Y) is the smallest 17-algebra generated by the Borel subsets 
of Y, and v is a measure on (Y,.F(Y)). The support of v is taken to be all of Y. Y 
will be referred to as the state space. 
N 2 (0, .F(0)) is a measurable space. 0 is assumed to be a compact subset of a 
complete s eparable metric space, and .F(0) is the smallest 17-algebra generated by 
the Borel subsets of 0. 0 will be referred to as the parameter space. There is a 
distinguished element ()* E 0 which is the true parameter. 
N 3 P(0) is the space of all probability measures on (0, .F(0)) .  A standard result 
{see, e.g. Parthasarathy {34, Theorem 6.4-1]) states that by the compactness of 0, 
P( 0) is compact under the ( metrizable) topology of weak convergence. E lements of 
P(0) that place an atom of mass 1 at () E 0 will be denoted by 80. { This is a 
s light abitse of notation since that symbol will usually be reserved for the Dirac delta 
function at the value () but we use it since it has been used in the economic literature 
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on Bayesian learning). We shall denote the support of an element.\ E P(0), i. e. the 
subset of 0 on which .\ places positive mass, by supp(.\) .  
N 4 (X, F(X)) is a measurable space. X is a compact subset of a complete separable 
metric space, and as usual, F(X) is the smallest CT-algebra generated by the Borel 
subsets of X. (X,F(X)) will be referred to as the action space. 
N 5 There is a bounded measurable function r: X x Y X Y -+ � referred to as the 
(instantaneous) reward function. 
N 6 (3 E (0, 1) denotes a discount factor. 
2.2 The Repeated Statistical Decision Framework 
Consider an agent who in each period picks an action x E X, observes a state y' E Y, 
and receives a reward r(x, y') (there is a slight abuse of notation here; in the general 
sequential framework, this will be r(x, y, y' ) ,  in this special case, we mean by r(x, y' ) 
that the reward only depends on the first and last arguments). The agent chooses the 
value of x to maximize expected discounted sum of rewards over an infinite horizon; 
I.e. 
00 
maxE0 L (3'r(xt. Yt+i) 
{xo} t=O 
subject to a natural constraint defined by the stochastic law governing the distribution 
of the state y' . The conditional distribution of state y' given the chosen action x 
defining that law denoted by f (y'lx, O*)  where O* E 0 is the true parameter defined in 
the previous subsection. If{}* is known to the agent, then simple (one period) expected 
value maximization of r(x , y' ) is optimal in the infinite horizon and entails solving a
repeated problem, hence the title of this subsection. This is no longer true if (}* is 
unknown to the agent, since the current action, and the observed state therein jointly 
reveal information about the value of {}* driving the distribution of y' given x. 
To elaborate, suppose the agent starts with a prior .\0 E P(0). Assume that supp(.\0) = 
0, or more generally that(}* E supp(.\0 ) .  The agent's prior represents his belief about 
O*, i.e. Pr{O* E A} = .\0(A) for A E F(0). Assume further that the conditional 
density of y given (x,IJ ) E (Xx 0) is given by f( . lx, IJ) , and that the agent perfectly
knows the value of f for each pair (x, IJ); and hence his only ignorance is the value ()
takes and the realization of y' resulting form the draw from f. When the agent chooses 
an action x E X , and observes a state y' E Y, two things happen. First, a reward of 
r( x, y') is received. Second, the agent uses the observed pair (x, y') to update his beliefs
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about the value of ()*. The posterior belief A1 E P( El) will be achieved by applying
Bayes' rule: 
J J(y'lx, O ).Ao(d() ) 
Ai(A) = f f(y'lx, O ).Ao(d()) e 
for A E .F(El). It is this ability of actions to generate information that converts the 
repeated problem into a sequential one, with state space P(El). This process now 
repeats itself with priors A1, choosing an action, observing a state, and updating to A2,
and so on. 
Easley and Kiefer [14] have shown that the agent's maximization problem may now 
be represented as a dynamic programming problem with state space P(El) and action 
space X. Given A E P(El) and x E X, the density f now induces a distribution 
over P(El) for the next period's prior (which is the posterior that the agent obtains 
by applying Bayes' rule). Under some regularity conditions, an appeal to Maitra [29] 
shows the existence of a (stationary) optimal policy g: P( El) -> X. Their main results 
may be summarized as follows: 
1. Since the distribution of tomorrow's state depends only on today's state and
action, and the latter under the optimal policy is itself a function only of today's
state, the agent's beliefs follow a Markov process.
11. The agent cannot expect his beliefs to change in any way he can predict; conse­
quently, the state follows a Martingale; i.e. for all t, we have E[At+i(A)IA,] = At(A)
for all A E .F(El).
111. Construction of the underlying probability space, and an appeal to the martingale 
convergence theorem now reveal the existence of a P(El)-valued random variable 
A00 such that At :;.. A00 a.s. [P,10], where P,10 is the measure induced on sample 
paths by the initial belief A0• 
1v. A00 may not coincide with 88., i.e. full learning need not occur. Notice that 
here, as below, we are abusing notation by letting A00 denote both a random 
variable and its realization; but since we do not anticipate any confusion, and 
since this abuse of notation is also prevalent in the preceding literature, we shall 
continue using it. Full learning obtains, however, if the discount factor j3 is large 
enough (i.e. A00 = 88.a.s. [P,10]) .  In this context, results on incomplete learning in 
McLennan [32], and Feldman and McLennan [21] are also relevant. 
v. Since g(At ) E X for all t, and X is compact, g(At ) contains a convergent sub­
sequence. If g( At) -> x00, then x00 maximizes one period expected payoff given
beliefs A00• Further, limit beliefs are invariant for limit actions; i.e. if the agent
starts with prior A00 and takes the action x00, then the updated beliefs will also be
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\"' a.s.[P,100]. Indeed this is the source of possible incomplete learning that Easley 
and Kiefer refer to the most; i.e. if the action sequence converges to some x00 too 
rapidly, then the beliefs may get trapped at some .\00 # 80• which is invariant to 
that X00• 
All these convergence results relate to convergence under the prior belief of the decision 
maker on the set of sample paths. In other words, the almost sure convergence of >., 
to some limit belief .\00 E P(El) guaranteed by the martingale convergence theorem 
states that the agents expect that they will converge almost surely with respect to the 
probability measure induced on sample paths by their initial belief. As argued in the 
introduction, this is not the same as the almost sure convergence with respect to the 
probability measure that a neutral observer who knows the value of (}*, and the initial 
priors .\0, will use. We shall return to this point in section 4 below. 
2.3 The Sequential Statistical Decision Framework 
The flavor of the sequential framework is perhaps best caught by a simple example. 
Consider the stochastic one-sector model of optimal growth. In each period, an agent 
observes a stock y <:: 0, decides on the fraction x E [O, l] to be consumed, and receives 
a reward of r(x,y) = u(xy) where u is a utility function from consumption. The
remaining stock (1- x )y forms the investment for the period, and is converted into the 
next period's stock y' through a production function f which depends on parameter(s) 
(}*, and the realization of a random variable� as y' = /((1  - x)y, �; (}*). The agent's
objective is to maximize the expected discounted sum of utilities from consumption 
over the infinite horizon. When the parameter(s) (}* of f, and the distribution of� are 
known, this fits into the standard stochastic dynamic programming framework. When 
(}* is not known, however, an action x at a stock y has three effects. First, it yields 
a utility u(x, y); second, it determines the distribution of the next period's stock; and 
finally, it yields information about the value of(}* which will be used by the agent when 
determining next period's level of consumption. 
It is the general formulation of problems of this sort that is carried out in this section. 
In each period, takes an action x E X after observing a state y E Y. The state then
evolves to a new state y' according to the probabilistic transition density q(. lx, y, (}*), 
and the agent receives a reward of r(x, y, y'). The process then repeats with y' replacing 
y. The value of(}* is, however, unknown to the agent, who starts with a prior .\ over
El. As before, we assume that (}* E supp(.\) . If y' is the state observed in the next 
period, then the agent revises his prior .\ to a posterior >.' using the Bayesian updating 
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formula 
J q(y'lx, y, ll).,\( dlJ) 
,\'(A) - A (2 1) - J q(y'lx, y, ll) . .\(dll) 
· 
e 
where A E .F(El). Now, based on his knowledge of y' and his new prior,\', the decision 
maker takes an action x' E X, and the process repeats. 
To convert the agent's expected utility maximization problem into a dynamic program­
ming problem a la Easley and Kiefer [14], some additional notation and assumptions 
are introduced. First, we denote the map in (2.1) by B: Y x Xx Y x P(El)-> P(El) so 
that if (Yt+i, x,, y,, ,\1) represent respectively the period t + 1 value of the state y, the 
period t action, the period t state y, and the period t belief, then we have 
f q(Yt+ilx,, y,, ll) . .\,(dil)
.\1+1(A) = B(Y1+1,x,,yi,.\1)(A) = J ( I ll) ,\ (dll) (2.2 ) q Yt+1 x,, y,, . t e 
for A E .F(El). 
Next, for the rest of this paper, we shall be considering the augmented state space 
S = Y x P(El), and endow S with the product metric topology. Since Y and P(El) 
are compact, so is S. A generic element of S is denoted bys = (y, .\). Now, given a 
states E S, and an action x E X, the conditional transition density q(.lx,y, ll) induces 
a conditional distribution over S that we denote by Q(.ls,x). This is defined by 
Q(Als,x) = j j IA(y',B(y',x,s))q(y'lx,y,ll)v(dy'),\(dll) (2.3) 
e Y 
for A E .F(S) wheres = (y, ,\), and IA is the indicator random variable which equals 1 if 
s E A and 0 otherwise, and as usual, .F( S) is the smallest a-algebra containing the Borel 
subsets of S. Fors E S , we also define r(x, s) = fe fy r(x, y, y')q(y' lx,y, ll)v(dy'),\(dll).
For the remainder of this paper, we shall be using r to refer to the expected reward 
function which now maps X x S into �. 
Finally, we impose some regularity conditions on the various components: 
A 1 r: X x S -> � is jointly continuous on X x Y. 
A 2 For all (x,y,ll) E X  x Y x El, supp(q(.lx,y,ll)) = Y. 
A 3 q: Y x X x Y x El -> �+ is jointly continuous in all its arguments. 
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Our first result is the continuity of the Bayes map. This result is also stated and proved 
in Easley and Kiefer [14]. We adopt a slightly different method of proof by appealing 
. directly to the standard integration to the limit result in Billingsley [3]: 
Lemma 2.1 B: Y x X x Y x P(0)-+ P(0) is a continuous map. 0 
Proof: Let (y�, Xn, Yn, An) -+ (y', x, y, A) in the appropriate product topology. Define
k(n)(I!) = q(y�lxn,Yn,11), and k(li) = q(y'lx,y, 11) . By A.3, k(n)(l!n) -+  k(li) for all se­
quences lin -+ Ii. Since An => A in the weak topology, Theorem 5.5 in Billingsley [3] implies
that 
= j k(li)A(dli) = j q(y'lx,y,li)A(dli) 
e e 
Obviously, this also holds when the integral is evaluated over any set A E .F( 0 ) . with
A(A) > 0. From the form of the Bayes updating rule (2.1), taking the limits in (2.1) 
establishes the result. . • 
Lemma 2.1 enables us to establish the following result regarding the weak continuity 
of the transition on the augmented state space. 
Lemma 2.2 Q is weakly continuous . That is, if (xn,sn) E X  x S converges to (x,s) 
in the product topology, then Q(.lxn, sn) => T(.lx,s). 0 
Proof: Let h: S -+ R be continuous (and hence bounded by the compactness of S) . Then
we need to show that 
j h(S)Q(dslxn,sn)-+ j h(s)Q(dslx,s) 
s s 
the L.H.S. may be written as 
j j h(Y , B(y, Xn, Yn, An) )q(ylxn, Yn, li)v( dy)>.n( di!)
e Y 
and using the continuity of h, Lemma 2.1, A.3, and the weak convergence of An to >., another
appeal to Theorem 5.5 in Billingsley [3] completes the proof. 11 
Now, the quintuple (S, X, Q, r, (3) defines a standard stochastic dynamic programming 
problem with compact state space S, compact action space X, weakly continuous 
transition Q, continuous reward function r, and a discount factor (3 E [O, l]. The main 
result of Maitra [29] directly applies and we have the main theorem of this section. 
El-Gamal f3 Sundaram, August 1 6, 1989 __________________ 11 
Theorem 2.1 
s E S 
i. There exists a continuous function V: S --+ � such that for all
V (  s) = max{r( x, s) + /3 j V (s' )Q ( ds' lx, s)}xEX (2.4) 
s 
ii. The set of maximizers in equation (2.4) defines an upper hemicontinuous cor­
respondence G: S --+ X. Further, G admits a measurable selection g: S --+ X.
0 
Proof: See Maitra [29]. 
In words, Theorem 2.3 says that the agent can do no better at maximizing expected 
sum of discounted rewards than by taking the action g( s) whenever the state is given
by s E S. We refer tog in the rest of this paper as a stationary optimal policy function. 
Since g is an optimal policy function if and only if g is a measurable selection from G, 
in general, many stationary optimal policy functions may exist. However, all of them 
will give the same expected reward over the infinite horizon; namely that specified by 
V .  Therefore, we assume from now on that the agent has selected some function g 
that we shall henceforth hold fixed. 
3 The Martingale Property of Beliefs: Subjective Convergence 
When the decision maker picks an optimal stationary policy g: S --+ A, a Markov 
process arises on S, with the conditional distribution of St+i given St given by 
Pr{ st+1 E A l st} = j Q ( dslg( st) , st ) 
A 
The measurability of Q in St follows from our assumptions and the measurability 
of g. However, unlike the case of the repeated statistical decision problem, beliefs 
alone (which are only one component of the augmented state space) need not follow a 
Markov process, and in general, they will depend on the entire past of beliefs. On the 
other hand, since it is still true that the decision maker cannot expect his beliefs to 
change in any systematic way, beliefs will still follow a martingale with respect to the 
appropriate sigma-filtration. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate this, then 
use the martingale convergence theorem to show that beliefs converge to a limit belief, 
and to study the properties of the limit belief. The treatment in this section is simply 
attempting to demonstrate that the results of Easley and Kiefer [12, 14] still hold in 
this more general framework where the Markovian property for beliefs has been lost. 
We start by introducing some new notation that will be useful in constructing the 
sigma-filtration with respect to which the sequence of beliefs will be shown to have the 
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Martingale property. Let Z =Xx Y, Z1 = x�=1Z, Z_1 = X�1+1Z, and Z00 = x�1Z. 
Define the sub sigma fields Z1 on Z00 by Z1 = {AC Z00:A = C X Z_1;C E .F(Z1)} ; 
where as usual .F(Z1) is the smallest sigma field generated by the Borel subsets of Z1• 
Also, let Z00 = Vf::1 Z1• Note that Z1 is the set of measurable events observable after t 
periods.5 
For (} E El and A E Z11 let Pro (A) be the probability under the parameter (} of 
observing (z11 z2, ••• , z1) E C, where A= C x Z_1• Pro is calculable from knowledge
of the underlying functions and the optimal policy 9, and is measurable in (} since g is 
measurable. The measurable space of sample paths ((El X Z00), o-(.F(El) x Z00)) may now 
be endowed with the probability measure PAo which is the extension of Pr(D x A) = 
J Pru ( A)-Xo (dfJ) for D E  .F(El), and A E Z00• 
D 
The probability at time t that the agent places on the set D E .F( El) can then simply 
be written as At(D) = E[Inxz= 1z;_1J where z:_I = Zt-1 x {0, El}. It is clear by 
construction that z7_1 i z:;,, where as usual, z:;,, = Vf::1Z7 , and it follows by Billingsley
[4, example 35.5, p. 410] that .\ 1 (D) is a martingale. As lnxz= is an indicator random
variable, ,\1(D ) ::::'. 1 a.s. for all t. Therefore, by the martingale convergence theorem 
(Billingsley [4, p.416] ) ,  there exists a limit random variable denoted by ,\00 such that 
At =? Aoo a.s. [PA0]. 
This result is the same as that achieved in Easley and Kiefer [12, 14], and as in their 
case, it is true that in general, it need not be the case that ,\00 = 811* a.s. [PA0]. As stated
less rigorously in the introduction, the current state y influences next period's state 
and may hence force learning regardless of  what the agent decides to do, (i.e. forces 
consistency results in the case of passive learning to come in action). In the repeated 
framework literature, full learning has been shown to hold under suitable conditions 
about how fast agents discount the future (for instance see Easley and Kiefer [12, 14]) .  
All that we require here is the very mild identifiability condition 1.1 as well as the 
assumption 1.2 of the continuity of the optimal policy function g. 
1.1 For all priors ,\ with support of more than one point, 3 sets A, B E .F(El) with 
.\ (A) > 0 and ,\(B) > 0 such that 
q (y' ly, g(y,-X) , B) f q (y' ly, g(y,-X) ,B)
for all B E A and B E B, and for some (y, y') E Y x Y.
1.2 The optimal policy selection g is  continuous in ,\. 
Under that very mild condition we prove the full learning result: 
5Note the slight error here in Easley and Kiefer [12, 14]. The appropriate o--field after t-periods in their 
case should be the ct-field generated by the cylinder sets of the form (C x Z-t) for C a Borel subset of 
(Z,_1 x X), not as they claim, (C x z_,) for Ca Borel subset of z,. 
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Lemma 3.1 Under conditions 1.1 and 1.2, the limit belief\"' achieved from the mar­
tingale convergence theorem is equal to S0.. 0 
Proof: Let the limit belief for simplicity of notation be ,\, Choose a set A such that 
.\ (SA ) = 0, then
f q(Yt+i I Yt, g(yt, At), 0). At ( dO)
At+1(A) =A _________ _ f q(Yt+i IYt, g(yt, At), IJ). At ( dlJ)e 
(3.5) 
taking limits of both sides as t j oo, and by the continuity of q and the continuity of g 
(assumption 1.2), it is readily seen that the limit .\00 = ,\ is invariant to the Bayesian
updating rule B. Now, by that invariance, 
which can be rewritten as 
f q(y' IY, g(y' A), 0) . .\ (  dO)
,\ (A) - �A .,.--,--.,.--,--,--- - ,--,----f q(y' lg(y, .\ ) , IJ) . .\ (dlJ) e 
J . j' q(y'ly, g(y, >., B) • 1 .,\(dlJ) =
A f q
(y' ly, g(y, .\), IJ) . .\(dlJ) . .\(d
lJ)
A e 
and equality (3.2) has to hold for all sets A E F(E>), and hence 
q(y' ly , g(y,.X ), B ) = J q(y'ly, g(y, .X, 1J ) . .X ( d1J)e 
= I< (.\, y, y' )  
(3.6) 
(3. 7) 
(3.8) 
almost surely [ ,\ J ;  where I< ( >., y, y') is a constant that depends only on the shown arguments.
Now, by A.2 and A.3 (the assumptions of full support and continuity of the transition q), 
there is a positive probability of getting within a small neighborhood of (y, y') E Y X Y of 
assumption 1.1. Hence, by assumption 1.1, the only possible almost sure [P.\0] limit belief 
from the martingale convergence theorem used above has to have a one-atom support. But 
by the continuity of the Bayes updating map B and the full support assumption of the initial 
prior >.0, convergence to a point mass at a "wrong" single point is a [P.\0] measure zero event, 
and the warranted result is proved. • 
Assumption 1.2 was also used in the literature [14] and justified possibly on the basis 
of more fundamental assumptions including the strict concavity of the payoff function 
r. It is clear from the setup and proof of Lemma 3.1 that the same result can be
obtained in the repeated framework of [12, 14] using the same two assumptions. It 
must be noted however, that assumption 1.1 in the repeated framework is extremely 
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restrictive since it can be violated by the agent choosing to play the same action forever, 
and hence not learn. In our sequential framework, however, condition 1.1 can only be 
violated if the optimal policy selection g is such that g(y, A) and y will move in such 
a perfectly offsetting way that the true parameter will be unidentifiable. We therefore 
conclude that the result of Lemma 3.1 is more useful in the sequential framework since 
its conditions are much milder in that framework. 
4 Limit Beliefs from the Perspective of an Informed Objective Observer 
In the previous section, we showed that in this generalized sequential statistical decision 
problem, with the augmented state space, we can still achieve the results of Easley and 
Kiefer [12, 14] of convergence of beliefs almost surely with respect to the probability 
measure on the space of sample paths generated by the decision maker's prior belief on 
0. As we described this result in the introduction, it is stating that the agents think
that they will converge to a limit belief a.s. This is clearly not the interesting question 
to the economist who knows the true value of 0* (since he wrote the model) ,  and can 
imagine a large class of possible prior beliefs Ao with which he may endow the agents 
in his model. This section introduces an alternative formalization of the modelling 
process. To study the economist's problem of assignment of priors to the agents, 
and study the evolution of measures in the model, we need to study the evolution of 
measures on the augmented state space. We leave that to the next section. In this 
section, we just introduce an objective observer who is equipped with the knowledge of 
the true parameter 0* and a prior on P(0), denoted by µ0 , where µ0 (A) = Pr{ Ao E A} .  
The objective observer sits on the margin of P(0) in our augmented state space, and 
observes the evolution of µ1• 
Before we proceed with the study of what we may call 'objective convergence' (from 
the perspective of the informed observer with knowledge of the true 0*) in general 
spaces, we note a simple though surprising result. In a finite or countable parameter 
space with the agents being assigned proper priors with full support (i.e. there is 
a positive probability assigned to each of the points in the parameter space), the 
subjective convergence result immediately yields an objective convergence result. It is 
clear, however, that such a convergence result is restricted to the case with an atomic 
parameter space since with continuous parameter spaces and atomless priors, the proof 
below will not work since any single 0 E 0 (in particular (}*) is of Ao measure zero,
and Po* (the probability under the true distribution determined by 0* of convergence
of beliefs can be anything. 
Theorem 4.1 Let the parameter space be 0 = {01, 02, . . .  }, and 0* = Ok for some 
k E .N. Then, under the true (}*, the s equence of beliefs starting from any given ,\0 
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converges a.s. [Pe•]. 0 
. Proof Let Z E Z00 be the set of sample paths for which beliefs ..\, starting from any given 
..\o converge. Then by the martingale convergence theorem result cited prior to Lemma 3.1 
(subjective convergence of beliefs a.s. [P.10]), and by the definition of P.10, it follows that 
P.10(Z) = j Pre(Z) ..\0(d0) = 1 
e 
which in our case with a countable parameter space (and writing ..\0 as a vector {p1, p2, •••  } 
of probabilities corresponding to { 01, 02, ••• } ) reduces to 
I: P re,(Z)pk = 1 
kEN 
(4.9) 
but since we assume that ..\o is a proper prior; i.e. Pk > 0 Vk E N and LkEN Pk = 1 ,  it 
follows that the last equality above can only hold if Pre, ( Z) = 1 Vk E /I/. In particular, for 
the true O*, Pre·(Z) = 1. • 
To study the evolution of the economist's sequence of measures in a general space, we 
will need to fully characterize the convergence of iterates of the relevant kernel, which 
is done in the next section. In this section, we ask a simpler question: Is it true that 
for some large T, and starting from a large (probability one) set of prior beliefs, all
agents will be within some small neighborhood of some limit belief? In other words, 
given any particular value ,\00, is it true that there exists an E - neighborhood of ,\00 
and a time T = T(t) such that Vt ?'. T, µ,(N,(..\00)) = 1 .  If such a result was achieved,
it would justify the use of a single prior for all agents by means of an argument that 
the economy has been running long enough, and so almost all agents are arbitrarily 
close to some limit belief (an even more ambitious hope would be to also show that 
,\00 = De•, and then the argument will state that 'the agents would have learnt the 
structure of the model'). Unfortunately, the result we achieve is a negative one.· It 
turns out that given any fixed element (belief) in P(0), there will be positive mass 
outside a small neighborhood of that element for all time periods. With hindsight, 
this is not surprising under our assumptions of full support of µ0, since starting with 
priors that are far enough from the desired neighborhood, the elements of some non­
trivial neighborhood of that far away prior would not have converged by any given 
time period. Indeed, this is the idea and motivation of the proof provided below. Even 
though this result seems very natural once stated, we believe that the assumptions 
we provide are reasonable, and that this offers -to our knowledge- the first rigorous 
criticism of the loose approximation argument commonly used in economics to j ustify 
various versions of the rational expectations hypothesis. 
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The type of result we get in this section contrasts with the type of results sought 
and achieved in Feldman [20] based on inconsistency results of Bayesian inference in 
Freedman [22, 23] and Diaconis and Freedman [9] in more than one way. First, the. 
results of Freedman and Freedman and Diaconis, and hence those of Feldman, are 
for the case with an infinite dimensional parameter space; whereas we are aiming at 
results that hold from the perspective of a modelling economist (or in this section, 
the objective observer who only looks at the margin along P(0)) even in the standard 
finite dimensional parameter space. Second, the results in Freedman, and thus those in 
Feldman, show that convergence does not hold for a "large" (formally, residual) class 
of priors, but that class may very well be (as recognized by the authors) of measure 
zero. We are seeking a more measure theoretic result, since we want our economist to 
be no less intelligent than the agents he models; if they are Bayesian, so is he. Third, 
there is a discussion in Feldman [20] where he argues that an economist will endow 
his agents with priors that will converge, i.e. where learning is possible. However, 
such a requirement (ignoring the circular nature of the underlying argument) puts an 
immense burden on the shoulders of the modeler since in complicated models it may 
be prohibitively hard to show whether convergence and/or learning occurs. This point 
will be discussed further in the following sections. On the other hand, assuming that 
the economist solves the model for the class of priors that lead to learning and then 
restricts the class of priors with which he endows his agents to that class seems to us 
to be rather ad hoc. Such a procedure will be simply pushing the ad hoc assumption 
of rational expectations where the true distribution is known from period zero one step 
further. There is no epistemological gain from such a procedure, and we might just as 
well assume that .\0 = Do•. 
Now, we start with an economist who will endow agents with initial beliefs ,\0 drawn 
at random from a prior µ0 E P(P(0)), and inform the objective observer about the 
measure from which he drew those priors, as well as the true ()*, Since in the previous 
section, we imposed the restriction that ,\0 has full support on 0, we extend that 
characterization by assuming that the support of µ0 is the set of ,\'s that have fu!I 
support. 
A 4 supp(µ0 ) = {,\ E P(0): supp(,\ ) = 0}.
We also make the natural assumption that the economist is aware of the optimal policy 
function g: Y x P( 0) --> X that he lets his agents choose from the class G of section 2, 
and that he again informs his objective observer of that function. There is clearly no 
loss of generality in making this assumption since the economist is the one who assigns 
such a choice in the first place, and since he knows that such a choice g is stationary. 6 
6 Another interesting issue, \vhich \Ve do not consider in this paper; a.rises here: Could different selections 
of g give different convergence behavior in the next section? and if so, how?. 
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We define for each time t the probability that At E A by µt(A) where A E .F(P(8)). 
For example, for the first period, 
µ1(A) = Pr{(y',y) E Y x Y: B(y',y,g(y,A),A) EA} 
= j j j q(y'ly,g(y, A), O*)v(dy)v(dy')µ0(dA)
P(6) 13-1 (A;y,.\) Y 
We have implicitly assumed in the above transition that the initial value of y is drawn 
from a distribution on Y that is uniform w.r.t v. Everything that follows holds equally
well for a given fixed initial value y0. And given the economist's prior at period t of
where At of a typical agent will be, he gets a p osterior 
µt+t(A) = j j q(y'ly, g(y, A), O*)v(dy')µt(dA) 
P(6) 13-1 (A;y,.\) 
We ask the question posed above about the value of µt of a neighborhood of any given 
limit belief, and our result is: 
Theorem 4.2 Given any fixed value of ,\00, Vt, 3t > 0, Juch that 
0 
Proof: For a choice of 'small' numbers t, I > 0, pick a 1:1 E 8 such that l!A00 -88 I  :'.'.: t + 21; 
where 11·11 here refers to the metric of the weak topology. (Such a choice is always possible
since we can choose a 1:1 such that when we consider the distance between the integrals of a 
sequence of functions converging to 80, then their integral with respect to the measure A00 
will be converging to zero and the integral with respect to the measure 80 will be converging 
to unity.) Denote the open I neighborhood of 80 by N,,,(80) C P(8). We shall show that
for all t :'.'.: 0, µt(N,,,(80)) > 0, thus proving the theorem.
Now, by assumption A.4, µ0 has full support on the set of A's that themselves have full 
support. Hence, by the argument in the previous paragraph, we can easily see that there is 
a choice oft,/ > 0 such that the two neighborhoods N,(A00) and N,,,(80) are disjoint and
µ0(N,,,(80)) > 0. By induction, it suffices to show that if µt(N,,,(80)) > 0, then the same is
true for µt+l· For ease of notation, let A*= N,,,( 89 ). By definition,
µt+1(A*) = j j q(y'IYti9(Yt,A),O*)v(dy')µt(dA) (4.10) 
P(E>) .B-1 (A*;yt,>.) 
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By the assumption A.2 that q has full support, q(. [y,, g( >., y,), 8*) > 0. Since B is continuous
on Y X X X Y X P(8) (by Lemma 2.1), it follows that it is continuous in y1 for a fixed
augmented state (y,, >.). Hence, B-1 (A*; y,, >.) is open in Y. It remains now to show
that this set is non-empty. But that follows immediately since all Y maps 80 into itself
under B; hence, there exists a non-empty neighborhood in Y that maps into A*. Hence,
v(B-1 (A*; y,, >.)) > 0, which establishes that all the sets over which the integral (4.1) is
evaluated are of positive measure, and the integrand is positive over the entire state space, 
which establishes that µt+1 (A*) > 0. This proves the result of the theorem. • 
As a special case, Theorem 4.2 tells us that there is a positive probability that almost 
sure full learning does not occur in finite time. This translates into the following 
obvious corollary. 
Corollary 4.1 
µ,(N,(80•))  < 1
0 
Proof: In the proof of Theorem 4.2 replace >.00 everywhere with 88*. 11 
Notice that all we have shown in Theorem 4.2 is that the probability of almost sure 
convergence to any particular limit in finite time (and hence as a special case the 
probability of full learning in finite time) is less than 1 .  We did that by showing that 
some mass will be outside some neighborhood of that limit belief for all time. It may be 
the case however that the amount of mass outside such neighborhoods albeit positive 
for all t is converging to 0. In other words, it may still be the case that µ,(N, (>.00)) --> 1,
and we write this as µ, =} 8;00 • 
Even though this section shows that we cannot justify the assumption that the agents 
all have the same beliefs (usually the correct ones) on the basis that after enough time, 
all but a measure zero group are outside an arbitrarily small neighborhood of that 
belief, a weaker justification may be available. I f  we can show that µ,(N,(>.00)) --> 1 ,
then the argument will be verbally phrased to say that beyond some point in time, an 
arbitrarily large mass of the agents (strictly less than 1 )  will be in an arbitrarily small 
neighborhood of the limit belief. This is a significantly weaker j ustification since there 
are two parameters being driven close to zero (in the proof of Theorem 4.2 those are 
t and µ,(N:(>.00 ))). It is, however, one that may not be mathematically unfounded in
all cases as the stronger version has been proven to be. To study the convergence of 
measures in the model of section 3, we need to use different tools, which we introduce 
in the next section. 
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5 Convergence of Measures on the Augmented State Space: Harris Ergodicity 
of the Transition Kernel 
We now pick up the analysis where we left it in section 3. We know that the process 
At does not by itself form a Markov process, and we need to study the convergence of 
measures in the Markov process on the augmented state space Y x P(0). In section 3, 
we considered the transition kernel on that augmented state space from the view point 
of the individual agent with a prior ,\ given by: 
Q(Als) = j j IA(y', B(y1, 9(s), s))q(y' ly, g(s), O)v(dy'),\(d8)
e Y 
We shall continue to let the individuals solve their optimization problem as in section 
3. The convergence of beliefs, however, will be studied from the view point of the
economist with µ0 as the prior on priors introduced in the previous section. The 
relevant stochastic kernel on the measurable augmented state space (S, :F(S)) = (Y x 
P(0), :F(Y x P(0))), starting from the initial measure v 0 µ is going to be different 
from Q. We think of measures on S at each time period of the form Vt 0 µt, and 
consider the Markov kernel 
T(Als) == j j IA(y' , B(y', g(s) , s))q(y'ly ,g(s) , 8*)v(dy')µ(d,\)
P(6) Y 
We first notice the similarity between the transition from µt to µt+l and that of the cross 
measure Vt0µt. This is not surprising at all since Vt+l = fp(e) fy q(y'IYt, g(yt , .\),  O*)v( dy')µt(d,\)
which is purely determined by Yt and µt. The kernel T satisfies the properties of a 
stochastic Markov kernel; i.e. VA E :F(S), T(AI .) is measurable, Vs = (,\, y) E S, T(. ls) 
is a measure on (S, :F(S)) , and of course, Vs E S, T(Sls) = 1. We think of iterates T(n) 
of T according to the iterative formulation T(o) = I, and
r<nl (Als) = TT(n-1l (Als) = ls r<n-1l(ds is)T(Als)
The one period transition defined on any probability measure </> E P( 0) by </>T( A) = 
fs </>( ds )T( Als) We say that the set A E :F( S) is attainable or reachable from s (written
as s -->  A) if for some n ;::::: 1,  r<nl(Als) > 0. For any probability measure </> E P(S), we 
say that the kernel T is </>-irreducible if for all sets A with </>(A) > 0, and for all s E S, 
s -->  A (and in this case, we call </> an irreducibility measure of T). If T is </>-irreducible 
with respect to some probability measure </>, then we say that T is irreducible.7 We 
7Perhaps the notion of irreducibility is more familiar (or standard) in the finite case where T is a proba­
bility transition matrix, and it is associated with the existence of a single ergodic class. The Markov chain is 
then said to be ergodic, and that is equivalent to the convergence from any initial probability vector to the 
unique stationary distribution. A similar result in more general spaces is what we present in this section. 
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define a maximal irreducibility measure as an irreducibility measure with respect to 
which all other irreducibility measures are absolutely continuous. The following result 
about the existence of maximal irreducibility measures can be found in N ummelin [33] 
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that T is </>-irreducible for some </> E P( S), then 
i. There exists a maximal irreducibility measure for T.
ii. An irreducibility measure 1/; is maximal if and only if 1/;T � 1/;. 0 
Proof: See Nummelin [33, Proposition 2.4, p.13]. 
Now, we are ready for defining characteristics of T that will guarantee convergence
of iterates of T(n). For a fuller discussion and derivation of the result of interest, the 
reader is again referred to Nummelin [33]. Intuitively, the conditions for convergence 
of iterates of T(n) is very similar to the case with a unidimensional discrete state space
where T is a probability transition matrix, and results on convergence to a unique
stationary probability vector are standard. With a more general state space, the Hopf 
decomposition theorem tells us that the resulting Markov chain {Sn} can result . in 
dividing the space S into a dissipative part Sd (which is a countable union of set A; 
such that Pr{Sn E A; i.o.!So = s} = O;Vs E S), and a conservative part Sc such
that there exists a probability measure </> whereby for all sets A with </>(A) > 0, and 
for [</>]-almost all s E A, Pr{Sn E A i.o. ISo = s} = 1 .  The conservative part of S
is hence what we are after, since as in the discrete case, when all 'states' get visited 
infinitely often with probability one, we get the standard result that the proportion of 
time the process is in each of those states converges to the probability of that state 
under the unique stationary distribution. It is a more general result of that nature 
that we need. Conditions to get such a result are a little more complicated than the 
standard conditions on probability transition matrices for the unidimensional discrete 
case. We now define the conditions for such convergence, the definitions and major 
cited result here are again due to Nummelin [33] . 
Definition 5.1 The kernel T is aperiodic if there does not exist a sequence (T0, Ti, . . .  , Tm_1); 
m > 1 of nonempty set forming a period for the resulting Markov process Sn; i. e. s.t. 
for all s E T;, T(Tf ls ) = 0 for j = i + 1 (mod m) . 
Definition 5.2 An irreducible Markov chain {Sn} (i. e. one that is generated by 
an irreducible kernel T) is said to be Harris recurrent if for all s E S, Pr{Sn E
A i.o. !So = s } for all sets A s.t. 1/;(A) > 0, where again, 1/; is a maximal irreducibil­
ity measure for T. 
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Definition 5.3 An irreducible Harris recurrent Markov chain generated by a kernel 
T is positive Harris recurrent T has a stationary probability measure 7r," i. e. 7rT = 7r .
Definition 5.4 A Markov chain {Sn} generated by a kernel T is said to be Harris 
ergodic if it is aperiodic (def. 5. 2), and positive Harris recurrent (defs . 5. 3 & 5.4). 
The concepts specified in the above four definitions are what we need to get a result 
of convergence of iterates of T(n) much like the type of results we get for probability 
transition matrices that are irreducible. The following two results are the equivalent 
of ergodicity results in that simplified case. In the following two convergence results 
for iterations of the kernel, we use I I · II to be the norm of total variation.
Theorem 5.1 
</>, ,P E P(S), 
If {Sn} is an aperiodic Harris recurrent Markov chain, the for all 
Jim 11</>T(n) - ,PT(n) l l = 0n)oo 
0 
Proof: See Nummelin [33, corollary 6.7, p.113]. 
In words, if we are not guaranteed that an invariant measure exists, but the process is 
aperiodic and Harris recurrent as described above, even· though iterates of T(n) need 
not converge, starting with any two measures, their trajectories in P( S) with the law of 
motion T will get to look more and more identical as the number of iterations increases. 
The next theorem tells us that with the existence of an invariant measure 7r, i.e. with 
Harris ergodicity, the iterates of T converge to that unique invariant measure, and vice 
versa.8 
Theorem 5.2 A Markov chain Sn generated by a kernel T is Harris ergodic if and 
only if there exists a probability measure 7r E P( S) on ( S, :F( S)) such that for all 
</> E P(S), 
lim 11</>T(n) - 7rll = 0nioo 
in other words, this can be written as: for all s E S 
lim llT(nl ( . ls) - 7rl l  = 0n)oo 
0 
8We use the conditions for Harris ergodicity instead of the more familiar ergodicity for obvious reasons.
Ergodic theorems of the Birkhoff and von Neumann type only guarantee the Cesaro convergence of measures 
to the unique invariant measure. For the learning result, however, we need strong convergence of the measures 
on our augmented state space. That, as stated in the next theorem, is equivalent to the stronger notion of 
Harris ergodicity. Of course all we really need is weak convergence, but that corresponds to mixing conditions 
that are much harder to characterize, and so we content ourselves with this perhaps over-restrictive condition. 
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Proof: See Nummelin [33, proposition 6.3, p.1 14]. 
Now, comparing the convergence of iterates of T in this section with the results of the
previous section (which was mainly concerned with convergence of iterates of Q along 
the dimension of P(0)). The main result of section 4 follows immediately when we 
notice that every set of positive initial measure in Y x P( 0)  is reachable from some
other set of positive measure, which yields the same result that the complement of a 
small neighborhood of any particular measure .\,, in P( 0) will have positive measure 
at all time periods. The remaining question was whether or not µ, converged to any 
measure, and if so, whether or not that measure was 8;.00• We argued that to look at 
convergence of µ,, we need to look at convergence of iterates of T, (for a discussion
of the type of convergence we consider see previous footnote) and Theorem 5.2 above 
states that such convergence takes place if and only if T is Harris ergodic; and if the
maximal irreducibility measure, and hence the limit measure, have full support, the 
rational expectations hypothesis will be rejected at all levels. Instead of proceeding 
to offer sufficient conditions to insure that such a result does or does not achieve, and 
then examining how stringent those conditions are, we content ourselves in this section 
with demonstrating -by means of trivial examples- that under the conditions imposed 
so far, anything can happen. In other words, learning, non-learning, or partial learning 
may all occur. 
It is obvious that full learning may occur in the trivial case where q(y' \y, x, 11) = q(y \11); 
i.e. we are getting i.i.d. draws from the density q which depends only on the parameter 
II. To make it painfully obvious, let Y = (y1 , y2) where q(y1 \II) = II. Then this is
obviously a model of passive learning, and starting from any initial measure .\ with full 
support, the Bayesian estimate of II is equivalent asymptotically to On = � I::i;1 Iy,;y'
which is consistent by the SLLN. It is also obvious in other instances that convergence 
does not guarantee uniformity of posteriors for different agents in the sense that µ00 =f 
8;.00,or if such uniformity exists, that .\00 =f Ofi'<. Absence of uniformity is obvious in 
the special case of q(y'\y , x, 11) = 1 for all (x, y, 11) E X  x Y x 0. In that case all priors
stay the same, and µ0 = µ, = µ00 for all t ,  which by the full support of µ0 rules out 
the uniformity of posteriors for all agents. For a more sophisticated result, let us make 
the assumption that q exhibits enough variation; i.e. 
S.1 For some E > 0, and all values of II, y, .\, and x = g(y, .\), there exists a set A C Y
with v(A) > O s. t. Vy' E A, q(y'\y, g(y, .\), II) < 1 - E, and a set A C Y with v(A) > 0
s.t. Vy' E A, q(y'\y, g(y, .\), 11) > 1 + €. 
This assumption is slightly stronger than what is needed to rule out pathological cases 
like the one above where q is uniform, or ones where the actions x = g(y, .\) make q 
uniform so that no more learning can take place. We think that this assumption is 
reasonable, and one may think that under such assumption, we would achieve complete 
learning, or perhaps agreement on posteriors among agents. It is interesting, however, 
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that if we restrict attention to initial conditions in the measure-one subspace S = 
Y x D( 0 ), (where D( 0) is the space of atomless measures on 0 with full support) 
to note that we get the opposite result; namely, that if T is Harris ergodic, the limit 
measure on S, which we call v00 0 µ00 will have full support.
Example 5.1 Under the above conditions and assumption 5.1, if yn converges to a
measure 7r = v00 0 µ00, then that limit measure has full support on S. 0 
Proof: Since yn converges to 7r = v00 0 µ00, it follows that T is Harris ergodic by Theorem
5. 7 above. Hence, there exists a maximal irreducibility measure ,P whereby for all sets
A E Y X D(0) with ,P(A) > 0, Pr{ Sn E A i.o.} = 1. Now, for ,P to be a maximal
irreducibility measure, all other irreducibility measures have to be absolutely continuous with 
respect to it. Hence, it remains to show that some irreducibility measure has full support on 
S. But by assumption S .l ,  there is a positive probability that we get a sequence of y's so
that any set A with v 0 µ (where v 0 µ is some measure with full support) will ultimately 
be visited from any initial point s E S. Hence, there exists an irreducibility measure with
full support. Hence, the limit measure 7r must have full support. II 
In this section, we have shown that under reasonable conditions, even if measures µ1 
converged, they may not converge to any particular 0).00, not to mention 880 • •  This 
leaves us with the conclusion that we should abandon trying to find "reasonable" suffi­
cient conditions that insure that some form of the rational expectations hypothesis still 
holds, and consider any particular model (without the rational expectations assump­
tion) on its own merit; studying how information is collected and processed optimally
by agents, and how this influences asymptotic or equilibrium behavior in the economy. 
6 Numerical Investigations of Harris Ergodicity in Kiefer's Monopolist Problem 
As we stated earlier, the numerical investigations in this section are intended mainly as 
a suggestion of how to proceed where the theory abandons us. They are also very useful 
for outlining aspects of the model that one would not be able to see using standard 
methods. For the purposes of comparison, we follow exactly the model in Kiefer [25] of 
a monopolist maximizing his expected discounted profits while trying to learn which 
of two demand curves he faces. The demand curve gives a price which is distributed 
gaussian with mean a + (3 * q (where q is the quantity that the monopolist decides to 
produce) and variance unity. The parameters of the demand curve are allowed take
one of two values a1 = 50 and b1 = -5, or a2 = 38.89 and b2 = -3. For the full 
description of the mathematical and numerical issues involved in solving this problem, 
£ h. d- - - - - � - - �  T Y .  • , 1 Tr· r ' lL r .l "  +-we re er t e rea er to Kieter [:lo]. We nave reprooucea n.1e1er s resuns 1or a u1scoun, 
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factor of 0.25, and used them to further study the behavior of beliefs. As we argued 
in the introduction, Kiefer's numerical analysis (where he lets the monopolist choose 
the optimal quantity to produce given his prior, and then draws the price from the 
distribution that he knows is true (with a = ai and {3 = bi) and lets the agent update 
in a Bayesian fashion) is more in line with our study of objective convergence of beliefs. 
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of beliefs for 50 agents whose priors (the probability of 
a =  ai and {3 = bi , i.e. a number between 0 and 1 )  are drawn at random uniformly 
between 0 and 1 .  Figure 2 shows that after 20 iterations, almost all of the agents 
have converged to one of the two optimal invariant beliefs (1 ,  the correct belief, or 
1/2, the other optimal invariant belief - again see Kiefer [25] for details). We note 
how neighboring priors can result in very different time series behavior. This aspect 
could also be recognized in Figure 1 1  of [25] but it comes strongly into focus when 
we look at ensembles of agent-priors drawn from different economist-priors. Figure 3 
shows that with 100 agents drawn at random, and after 20 iterations, very few of them 
have not yet converged to one of the optimal invariant beliefs, but seem to be on their 
way to convergence. The question we are interested in here is the value of the limit 
probability of a monopolist whose initial belief (Ao in the notation of this paper) is 
drawn at random from the economist's prior on priors (µ0 in the notation of this paper
taken to be the uniform prior over [0,1] in our numerical investigations) converging 
to one or the other of the invariant measures (or perhaps not converging to anything 
or cycling, etc. in more general cases). We therefore wish to start looking at those 
pictures in a different way, in terms of measures on the interval [0,1] (which happens 
to be a full representation of P( 0)) and their evolution over time. 
This is done in Figure 4, where we started with an agent's prior on priors µ0 being
uniform over the interval [0,1], and generated 100 agents' priors Ao from that distri­
bution. We then let the process run for 20 time periods as done in the previous 3 
figures. Figure 4 shows clearly how all the mass ultimately gets accumulated at the 
two optimal invariant beliefs 1 /2 and 1 .  One thing that we could not observe without 
this experiment is that the mass is almost equally allocated to those two points. In 
other words, an economist with no information about the initial prior that his monop­
olist will have (and hence by the principle of insufficient reason or maximum entropy 
chooses the uniform prior over priors) should be after a reasonably short period of 
time confident that there is a probability half of his economist having learnt the true 
demand curve, and a probability half of his never getting to learn it because of getting 
absorbed in the other optimal invariant belief. It is clear that the process is not Harris 
ergodic, however, since starting from different absolutely continuous (w.r.t. Lebesgue) 
priors on priors will yield different masses at the two optimal invariant beliefs. For 
instance, we demonstrate this in Figure 5 by starting from a prior on priors density 
of the form f(x) = 2x. Since that prior put more mass near the true belief of unity, 
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this reflected in the limiting behavior putting significantly more weight on that belief 
in the end. Applying a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to the difference between the two 
limits obviously rejects at all reasonable significance levels, and the eyeball test here is 
more than sufficient. In more sophisticated models, one proceeds in the same manner, 
perhaps paying more attention to numerical variance reduction techniques to speed up 
convergence. 
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Figure 1 
10 periods of beliefs of 50 agents drawn uniformly 
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Figure 2 
20 periods of beliefs of 50 agents drawn uniformly 
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Figure 3 
20 periods of beliefs of 100 agents d
rawn uniformly
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Figure 4 
Evolution of beliefs from uniform prior on priors 
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Figure 5 
Evolution of b eliefs from prior on priors density = 2x 
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